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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES CLAUSE-COM-

Court of Appeals
for the Seventh Circuit has upheld the constitutionality of an Illinois reciprocity provision that requires that nonresident attorneys
pass that state's bar examination prior to admittance, but waives
that requirement with respect to former nonresident attorneys who
later establish residence in Illinois.
MERCE CLAUSE-EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE-The

Sestric v. Clark, 765 F.2d 655 (7th Cir. 1985).
Anthony J. Sestric, a member of the Missouri bar, filed suit in
the United States District Court for the Central District of Illinois
against responsible state officials to invalidate a state requirement
that precluded nonresident attorneys from being admitted to the
Illinois bar without first having passed the Illinois bar exam.' The
district court dismissed Sestric's complaint upon defendants' motion for summary judgment. 2 Sestric then appealed to the United
States Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit, which affirmed the result
reached by the district court.'
Sestric's challenge before the Seventh Circuit was directed at the
constitutional validity of Illinois Supreme Court Rule 705." That
1. Sestric v. Clark, 765 F.2d 655, 656 (7th Cir. 1985).
2. Id.
3. Id. at 657. Sestric's initial challenge at the district court level was directed at
Illinois Supreme Court Rule 703, which contained a provision that precluded nonresident
attorneys from taking the Illinois bar exam if such attorneys had been out of law school for
more than six years. The prohibition contained in Illinois Supreme Court Rule 703 was
rescinded while Sestric's appeal from the district court was pending. On appeal to the Seventh Circuit, the court permitted Sestric to change theories, thus enabling Sestric to redirect
his attack at Illinois Supreme Court Rule 705. 765 F.2d at 657.
4. 765 F.2d at 657. Illinois Supreme Court Rule 705 provided in pertinent part:
Qualification on Foreign License
Any person who has been admitted to practice in the highest court of law in any
other State ... may make application to the Board of Law Examiners for admission
to the bar without academic qualification examination, upon the following conditions:
(a) The educational qualifications of the applicant are such as would entitle
him to write the academic qualification examination in this State at the time
he seeks admission, and he has resided and actively and continuously practiced
law in such other jurisdiction for a period of at least five years of the seven
years immediately prior to making the application.
(b) ... An applicant from any jurisdiction which does not grant reciprocal
admission to attorneys licensed in Illinois on the basis of practice in this State
shall not be entitled to admission under this rule.
(c) . . .[TJhe applicant has written and successfully passed the Illinois profes-
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rule, which was basically a reciprocity provision,5 required nonresident attorneys6 to pass the Illinois bar exam, in addition to meeting certain other provisions, before being permitted to practice law
within that state on a permanent basis. 7 However, Supreme Court
Rule 705 waived the exam-taking requirement with respect to
(new) resident attorneys (attorneys licensed in a foreign state who
later established residence in Illinois)." Thus, a small class of (new)
resident attorneys could be admitted to the Illinois bar, without
academic examination, provided that such attorneys had fulfilled
certain other requirements.9 The crux of Sestric's complaint, therefore, was that Illinois had arbitrarily discriminated between experienced (new) resident attorneys and equally qualified nonresident
attorneys solely on the basis of residence. 10 In support of this
claim, Sestric relied on the Privileges and Immunities Clause, artisional responsibility examination or, in the alternative, the applicant proves to
the satisfaction of the board that he or she has written and scored a passing
grade (as determined by the board) on the Multistate Professional Responsibility Examination of the National Conference of Bar Examiners within five
years prior to the date of the application.
(d) . . . Each applicant shall establish, to the satisfaction of the Board of Law
Examiners, that he is an actual resident of the State of Illinois, that he is at
least 21 years of age, of good moral character and general fitness to practice
law, and that upon admission he will actively and continuously engage in the
practice of law in this jurisdiction . . . . Each application shall be supported
by a certificate of a judge of a court of general jurisdiction from which the
applicant seeks admission certifying that the applicant has been admitted to,
and that at the time of making said application he is a member in good standing of, the bar of that jurisdiction.
ILL. S.CT. R. 705.
5. 765 F.2d at 661. Bar admission reciprocity provisions, such as that contained in
ILL. S.CT. R. 705(b), have been implemented by a majority of states. See Hafter, Toward the
Multistate Practice of Law Through Admission by Reciprocity, 53 Miss. L.J. 1, 4 (1983).
Such provisions are a method of permanent admission, generally known as "admission by
reciprocity," "admission by comity" or "admission by motion," which afford qualified nonresident attorneys an alternative to admission by academic qualification examination. Id. at
3-4. Admission by motion should not be confused with admission pro hac vice, a universal
practice which enables nonresident attorneys to practice law in foreign jurisdictions in connection with specific matters, upon a court's discretion. Id. at 4 n.8. Thus, the inherent
limitations of admission pro hac vice are "no assistance to the relocating or multistate practitioner." Id.
6. For purposes of this casenote, unless otherwise qualified, the term "nonresident"
attorney shall signify an attorney who has not taken the Illinois bar exam and who was
initially licensed to practice law in a state other than Illinois.
7. 765 F.2d at 657. See supra note 4.
8. Id.
9. Id. The other requirements included, for example, reciprocal provisions between
Illinois and the applicant's state, fulfillment of the "continuous practice" requirement, and
compliance with the "professional responsibility" criteria. See supra note 4.
10. 765 F.2d at 661.
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cle IV, section 2, the Equal Protection Clause contained in the
fourteenth amendment, and the Commerce Clause, article I, section 8, clause 3.11 After observing that the issue raised by Sestric
was one of first impression at the federal appellate level,' 2 the
United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that
Illinois Supreme Court Rule 705, which treated a small class of
(new) resident attorneys more favorably than nonresident attorneys, did not violate any provision of the Constitution. 3
In so holding, the Seventh Circuit initially addressed Sestric's
Privileges and Immunities Clause argument. 4 Judge Posner, writing for the court, noted the significance of a recent decision of the
United States Supreme Court in Supreme Court of New Hampshire v. Piper,1 5 and concluded that the principal case could not be
resolved strictly on the basis of pre-Piper decisions.' In Piper, the
Supreme Court first held that the practice of law was a fundamental right; the Piper Court then held that the absolute exclusion of
nonresident attorneys from a state's bar violated the Privileges and
Immunities Clause.' 7 However, Judge Posner distinguished the
principal case from Piper on the grounds that the Illinois rule, unlike the rule in Piper, did not operate to exclude all nonresident
attorneys from practicing law in Illinois on a permanent basis. 18
In distinguishing Sestric's case from Piper, Judge Posner analogized Sestric's case to Baldwin v. Fish & Game Commission of
11. Id. at 656. The Privileges and Immunities Clause states:The Citizens of each
State shall be entitled to all Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the several States.
U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2.
The Equal Protection Clause states in pertinent part:No State shall make or enforce any
law which shall abridge the privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States.
nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
U.S. CONsT. art. XIV, § 1.
The Commerce Clause states in pertinent part:[The Congress shall have the power to]
. . . regulate Commerce with Foreign Nations, and among the several States ....
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl.3.
The Commerce Clause represents an affirmative grant of power to Congress to regulate
interstate commerce between states. As state interference with interstate commerce is not
expressly limited by the Constitution, Sestric's Commerce Clause claim necessarily flows
from the judicially created doctrine which has developed with respect to the negative implications of article I, section 8. See L. TamE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, § 6-1, 319-21
(1978).
12. 765 F.2d at 657.
13. Id. at 665.
14. Id. at 657.
15. 105 S. Ct. 1272 (1985). See infra notes 68-74 and accompanying text.
16. Sestric, 765 F.2d at 657.
17. Piper, 105 S. Ct. at 1277, 1281.
18. 765 F.2d at 658.

1262

Duquesne Law Review

Vol. 24:1259

Montana," in which the Supreme Court held that only fundamental rights were protected by the Privileges and Immunities
Clause. 0 Judge Posner reasoned that the "right" which the Illinois
rule denied Sestric was not the right to practice law in Illinois, but
merely the privilege that some new residents had of being permitted to practice law within that state upon motion. 1 Thus, the Seventh Circuit concluded that Sestric was not excluded in the Pipersense, since, as a nonresident, he was afforded the opportunity to
obtain admission to the Illinois bar by examination."
After concluding that Sestric had not been denied a fundamental right, 3 the Seventh Circuit further distinguished the principal
case from the "usual" Privileges and Immunities Clause case, in
which a state conditions a substantial "privilege" upon residence
within that state.2 Under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 705, only a
small class of (new) resident attorneys was favored while most
(old) resident attorneys, as well as all nonresident attorneys, were
required to pass the Illinois bar exam as a prerequisite to admission to the Illinois bar.25 Thus, the court concluded that the Illinois scheme, as such, did "not create a clear-cut preference for residents."2 6 Judge Posner rationalized that if Sestric's argument were
adopted, the ramifications of such a result would, in fact, be more
burdensome than the present rule upon all nonresident lawyers as
a class, as all nonresident attorneys, even those establishing resi7
dence in Illinois, would be required to pass the Illinois bar exam;
the net effect being to increase the cost of becoming an Illinois
19. 436 U.S. 371 (1978).
20. Id. at 388. The Baldwin Court stated: "Only with respect to those 'privileges' and
'immunities' bearing upon the vitality of the Nation as a single entity must the State treat
all citizens, resident and nonresident, equally." See infra notes 61-63 and accompanying
text.
21. Sestric, 765 F.2d at 658.
22. Id. Judge Posner reasoned that it was a "matter of conjecture" whether the exam
requirement would exclude many nonresident attorneys with a "serious desire to conduct a
substantial practice" in Illinois and stated that to exclude those with no such desire would
not contravene the policy underlying the Privileges and Immunities Clause. Id. at 659.
23. Id. at 658-59.
24. Id. at 659. See, e.g., Austin v. New Hampshire, 420 U.S. 656 (1975) (The state of
New Hampshire imposed a Commuters Income Tax only upon nonresidents while exempting residents of New Hampshire), Ward v. Maryland, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 418 (1870) (discriminatory tax imposed upon nonresidents engaged in commercial trading in the state of

Maryland).
25.

765 F.2d at 659.

26. Id.
27.

Id.
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2
resident while not affording the relief sought by Sestric.
Based upon the above reasoning, the Seventh Circuit concluded
that Sestric had failed to make out a prima facie case under the
Privileges and Immunities Clause.29 Further, Judge Posner emphasized that even had a prima facie case been made out, the constitutionality of the Illinois rule would have been upheld even after applying the Piper test.30 The Seventh Circuit reasoned that the
requirement that nonresident attorneys pass the Illinois bar exam
had a "close or substantial" relationship to the state's legitimate
objective of maintaining the quality of its bar.3 ' The court also emphasized that less discriminatory alternatives to the Illinois rule
could not be reliably calculated. 2
The Seventh Circuit next briefly addressed the claim raised by
Sestric that the Illinois rule violated the "negative" Commerce
Clause. 3 Judge Posner explained that the burden placed upon
nonresident attorneys was rationally related to the state's legitimate interest in promoting the quality of its legal profession.3s A
determination was also made by the court that the rule may have,
in fact, increased the interstate mobility of all attorneys. 3 Thus,
the court concluded that the Illinois bar rule imposed only a minor
"inconvenience" upon nonresident attorneys, and did not, as such,
create an unreasonable burden upon the interstate movement of
3

lawyers.

1

Finally, the Seventh Circuit disposed of Sestric's claim that Illinois Supreme Court Rule 705 violated the Equal Protection
28. Id. The Seventh Circuit emphasized that while it was "clearly constitutional" to
require all nonresident attorneys to pass the Illinois bar exam prior to admitting such attorneys to that state's bar, adoption of such a rule would not improve Sestric's position and
would place (new) resident attorneys in a worse position. Id.
29. Id. at 661.
30. Id. at 664. The two-part Privileges and Immunities Clause test adopted by the
Supreme Court in Piper requires that the state show both a "substantial reason" for the
discrimination, and a "substantial relationship" between the discrimination and the state
objective as demonstrated by an absence of less discriminatory alternatives. Piper, 105 S.
Ct. at 1281. See infra notes 68-73 and accompanying text.
31. Sestric, 765 F.2d at 664.
32. Id. at 664-65. See infra notes 118-19.
33. 765 F.2d at 661. See supra note 11 (pertaining to Sestric's Commerce Clause
claim).
34. 765 F.2d at 661. In its Commerce Clause analysis, the court examined "both the
gravity of the interference with free interstate trade and the justifications offered for it, to
see whether the burden [was] an unreasonable one in the circumstances." Id. at 664.
35. Id. at 661.
36. Id. at 661, 664.
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Clause. 7 Judge Posner first suggested that the Illinois rule did not
discriminate between similarly situated persons.3 ' Furthermore,
the court held that even had there been a discrimination between
equally qualified nonresident attorneys, such discrimination was
rationally related to a legitimate state purpose.39 The court emphasized that a nonresident attorney who established residence in Illinois was making a "firmer commitment" to "bone up" on Illinois
law, and that it was not patently unreasonable to make a nonresident attorney pass the Illinois bar exam if such attorney merely
wanted to establish a multi-state practice.4 While noting that the
Illinois rule was "underinclusive," Judge Posner maintained that
that fact alone did not make the rule unconstitutional. 1
In conclusion, Judge Posner reasoned that striking down the Illinois rule would force the state to choose between abolishing its
reciprocity provision and accepting a substantial number of nonresident attorneys on motion.4 2 In light of the universal acceptance
of the bar exam as a means of promoting the quality of a state's
legal profession, and in view of the state's interest in controlling
who may practice law within its jurisdiction, the Seventh Circuit
held that the Illinois rule did not violate any provisions of the
Constitution.4 3 Thus, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
affirmed the district court's determination that the requirement
was valid."
The cornerstone of the Sestric decision was the assumption by
the Seventh Circuit that there was some constitutionally significant difference between admission by motion and admission by examination.4 5 Therefore, in order to assess the soundness of Sestric,
37. Id. at 661.
38. Id. at 660, 661.
39. Id. at 661.
40. Id. at 660-61.
41. Id. at 663. The Seventh Circuit postulated that the Equal Protection Clause in no
way "ordain[ed] in effect a national bar." Id.
42. Id. The Seventh Circuit was not convinced that less discriminatory alternatives
could adequately protect the state's interest in maintaining the quality of its legal profession. Id. at 665.
43. Id. at 665.
44. Id.
45. The Sestric Court read the Piper decision very narrowly, limiting its scope to the
specific facts of Piper, wherein the nonresident attorney had passed the New Hampshire bar
exam. Because Sestric sought admission to the Illinois bar via a reciprocity statute (Illinois
Supreme Court Rule 705), the Seventh Circuit held that Sestric was clearly distinguishable
from Piper. Indeed, the Sestric Court refused to concede that the impact of the Illinois rule
impaired a fundamental right, that there had been any discrimination, in fact, between similarly situated nonresident attorneys, that the Illinois rule was not rationally related to a
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the historical scope of the Privileges and Immunities Clause, the
Commerce Clause and the Equal Protection Clause must be
examined.
Historically, the roots of the Privileges and Immunities Clause,
contained in article IV, section 2, can be found in the Articles of
Confederation. 8 Undoubtedly, the purpose of the clause was to
promote the formation of a national union, not a "league of
states."'7 In the formative years of Privileges and Immunities
Clause analysis, the Supreme Court attempted to use the clause as
a vehicle for reading a natural rights doctrine into the Constitution.48 Thus, in the seminal case of Corfield v. Coryell,4 9 the Court
premised its holding upon the notion that each citizen of the
United States possessed a bundle of "natural rights" which were
constitutionally protected from state discrimination regardless of
which state such citizen occupied.50 Although subsequent decisions
by the Supreme Court had seemingly discarded the "natural
rights" theory suggested in Coryell, the Court has indicated that
the "rights" specifically enumerated in the Coryell decision do fall
legitimate state purpose, or that the Illinois rule did not satisfy the stringent Privileges and
Immunities test as set forth in Piper. But see infra notes 83-86.
46. The fourth article of the Articles of Confederation provided in pertinent part:
The better to secure and perpetuate mutual friendship and intercourse among the
people of the different states in this union, the free inhabitants of each of these
states, paupers, vagabonds and fugitives excepted, shall be entitled to all privileges
and immunities of free citizens in the several states; and the people of each State
shall have free ingress and regress to and from any other State, and shall enjoy
therein all the privileges of trade and commerce, subject to the same duties, impositions, and restrictions, as the inhabitants thereof respectively ....
Hicklin v. Orbeck, 437 U.S. 518, 532 n.16 (1978) (quoting 9 JOURNAL OF THE CONTINENTAL
CONGRESS, 908-09 (1777) (Library of Congress ed. (1907)).
47. See Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168, 180 (1868), wherein the Court stated:
Indeed, without some provision of the kind removing from citizens of each State the
disabilities of alienage in the other States, and giving them equality of privilege with
citizens of those States, the Republic would have constituted little more than a league
of States; it would not have constituted the Union which now exists.
Id. at 180. See also Austin v. New Hampshire, 420 U.S. 656, 660-63 (1975); Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385, 395 (1948). See generally TRiBE, supra note 11, § 6-32, at 404.
48. See TRmE, supra note 11, § 6-32, at 406. See also Baldwin, 436 U.S. at 387;
Corfield v. Coryell, 6 Fed. Cas. 546, 551-52 (No. 3230) (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823).
49. 6 Fed. Cas. 546 (No. 3230) (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823).
50. Id. at 552. In Corfield, the Court held that the Privileges and Immunities Clause,
at the very least, protected the following fundamental rights:
The right of a citizen of one state to pass through, or to reside in any other state, for
purposes of trade, agriculture, professional pursuits, or otherwise; to claim the benefit
of the writ of habeas corpus; maintain actions of any kind in the courts of the state;
to take, hold and dispose of property, either real or personal.
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within the scope of the Privileges and Immunities Clause. 51
The leading case of the 20th century with respect to the ability
of a state to create favorable employment opportunities for its own
citizens52 was Toomer v. Witsell. 5 In Toomer, the Supreme Court
defined the scope of the Privileges and Immunities Clause as follows: "It was designed to insure to a citizen of State A who ventures into State B the same privileges and immunities which the
citizens of State B enjoy." 4 The Toomer Court adopted a two-part
test in which state-imposed discrimination between residents and
nonresidents would be constitutional only if the state proved that
there were both a "substantial reason" for such discrimination, and
a "substantial relationship" between the discrimination practiced
and a legitimate state objective. 5 Furthermore, the Court held
that in order to clear the "substantial reason" hurdle, the state
must demonstrate that nonresidents, as a class, "constitute a peculiar source of the evil at which the statute is aimed."5 " Thus, the
significance of Toomer was that the Supreme Court shifted the focus of Privileges Immunities Clause analysis from the categorization of fundamental rights which attach to state citizenship toward
the justification offered by the state for maintaining the discrimination. 57 The two-part Toomer test was reiterated by the Supreme
Court in Hicklin v. Orbeck.5 8 In addition, the Hicklin Court held
that discrimination based upon state citizenship would not withstand Privileges and Immunities Clause analysis if less discrimina51. See Baldwin v. Fish & Game Comm'n of Montana, 436 U.S. 371 (1978), in which
the Baldwin Court held that the Corfield Court "used the term 'fundamental' . . . in the
modern as well as the 'natural right' sense." Id. at 387. Cf. Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496
(1939), in which Justice Roberts postulated:
It has come to be the settled view that Article IV, § 2, does not impart that a citizen
of one State carries with him into another fundamental privileges and immunities
which come to him necessarily by the mere fact of his citizenship in the State first
mentioned, but, on the contrary, that in any State every citizen of any other State is
to have the same privileges and immunities which the citizens of that State enjoy.
The section, in effect, prevents a State from discriminating against citizens of other
States in favor of its own.
Id. at 511.
52. For purposes of Privileges and Immunities Clause analysis, the terms "citizen"
and "resident" are "essentially interchangeable." See Hicklin v. Orbeck, 437 U.S. 518, 524
n.8 (1977) (quoting Austin v. New Hampshire, 420 U.S. 656, 662 n.8).
53. 334 U.S. 385 (1948).
54. Id. at 395.
55. Id. at 396.
56. Id. at 398.
57. See TRIaE, supra note 11, § 6-32, at 410.
58. 437 U.S. 518, 525-26 (1977).
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tory alternatives were available to the state.59 Thus, in light of
Toomer and Hicklin, the standard of review invoked in a Privileges and Immunities Clause context was difficult, though not impossible, for a state to satisfy. 0
The Supreme Court, however, significantly restricted the scope
of the Privileges and Immunities Clause in Baldwin v. Fish &
Game Commission of Montana.' The Baldwin Court held that the
Privileges and Immunities Clause protected only "fundamental"
rights, thereby giving renewed significance to the Coryell Court's
interpretation of the clause. 2 In Baldwin, the Court did not find
that a nonresident's right to hunt elk in Montana was sufficiently
fundamental, hence discriminatory licensing fees between residents
6 3
and nonresidents were upheld on a rational basis standard.
Taken together, the Hicklin and Baldwin decisions have delineated the approach that the Supreme Court has adopted in Privileges and Immunities Clause cases. First, the Court will make an
ad hoc determination as to whether or not state-imposed discrimination between residents and nonresidents has impaired a fundamental right.6 4 If the Court determines that a fundamental right
has not been impaired, such discrimination will be upheld upon a
minimum rationality standard of review. 5 On the other hand, if
the Court finds that state-imposed discrimination has burdened a
fundamental right, the discrimination will be subject to the stringent standard of review adopted by the Court in Hicklin. 6
Not surprisingly, the Supreme Court has consistently held that
the right to pursue one's livelihood (common calling) in a foreign
state is a fundamental right which comes within the purview of the
59. Id. at 528.
60. See infra note 64, at 84-85.
61. 436 U.S. 371 (1977).
62. Id. at 383. See supra notes 50-51 and accompanying text.
63. 436 U.S. at 388-89. Finding "no nexus between the activity and any fundamental
right," a sharply divided Baldwin Court upheld the discriminatory licensing fees as being
rationally related to a legitimate state objective. Id.
The Baldwin majority, per Justice Blackmun, cited Corfield as support for its holding
that the Privileges and Immunities Clause was intended to protect only "fundamental"
rights. Id. at 387. However, in a dissenting opinion, Justice Brennan (joined by Justices
White and Marshall) rejected the "fundamental" rights approach adopted by the Baldwin
majority. Id. at 399 (Brennan, J. dissenting). The dissenters presumably would apply the
two-part Toomer test whenever a discrimination between residents and nonresidents was
found by the Court.
64. See The Supreme Court, 1977 Term, 92 HARV. L. REv. 75, 82 (1978).
65. Baldwin, 436 U.S. at 387.
66. The Supreme Court, 1977 Term, supra note 63, at 82-85.
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Privileges and Immunities Clause. 7 In Supreme Court of New
Hampshire v. Piper,6" a case of significant importance in analyzing
the principal case, the Supreme Court held that the right to practice law was a fundamental right.6 ' After applying the two-part
Hicklin test, the Court specifically held that a New Hampshire bar
rule,'7 0 which absolutely excluded all nonresidents from admission
to the New Hampshire bar, violated the Privileges and Immunities
Clause.7 1 The Piper Court concluded that the state had failed to
show that there was a "substantial reason" for the discrimination
between resident and nonresident attorneys. The Court further
concluded that the state had failed to show that there was a "substantial relationship" between the discrimination and a legitimate
state interest as defined by the absence of less discriminatory alternatives.7 3 Thus, it was within this historical context that the
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit addressed Sestric's Privi74
leges and Immunities Clause argument.
In analyzing the principal case in a Privileges and Immunities
Clause context, the Seventh Circuit initially held that Sestric had
"failed to make out a prima facie case."71 5 In support of that conclusion, the court explained that Sestric had not been denied a
fundamental right and that Illinois Supreme Court Rule 705 did
not discriminate against nonresident attorneys.76 Nevertheless, the
Seventh Circuit's reasoning was not in accord with the holdings
rendered in Piperand in other decisions, primarily by state courts,
67. See, e.g., United Bldg. & Constr. v. Mayor & Council of Camdem, 104 S.Ct. 1020
(1984). In United Building, the Supreme Court stated: "Certainly, the pursuit of a common
calling is one of the most fundamental of the privileges protected by the [Privileges and
Immunities] Clause." Id. at 1028. See also Hicklin, 437 U.S. at 518; Baldwin, 436 U.S. at
387; Ward v. Maryland, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 418 (1870).
68. 105 S. Ct. 1272 (1985).
69. The Piper Court held that the practice of law was a fundamental right on two
grounds. First, the Court recognized the important commercial function that lawyers play in
a national economy. Second, the Court believed that nonresident attorneys served the important function of "championjing] unpopular causes" in foreign states. Id. at 1277.
70. Id. at 1281.
71. Id. at 1279-81.
72. Id.
73. Id. See also supra notes 114-15 and accompanying text.
74. Sestric v. Clark, 765 F.2d 655 (7th Cir. 1985).
75. Id. at 661.
76. Id. at 658-61. The Sestric Court stated:
Because Illinois has not barred nonresidents from practicing law; has not discriminated against residents in gross, and may not even have imposed a net burden on
nonresidents compared to the small class of favored residents, Sestric has failed to
make out a prima facie case under the privileges and immunities clause.
Id. at 661.
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which have addressed similar Privileges and Immunities Clause
issues.7 7
By holding that Sestric did not meet the threshold requirement
as set forth in Baldwin,75 the court apparently assumed that there
was some constitutionally significant difference between admission
by motion and admission by examination.75 Such an assumption
could only be derived from a very narrow reading of Piper, and in
disregard of the fact that the Piper Court specifically noted cases
in which the reasoning contained therein was broad enough to encompass the very issue raised by Sestric.80
1 a case which
In In re Jadd,8
was directly on point with Sestric,
the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts held that a similar
bar rule, which provided a waiver of the examination requirement
only to those nonresident attorneys who established residence in
82
Massachusetts, violated the Privileges and Immunities Clause.
The Jadd Court reasoned that a nonresident attorney's right to
equal treatment did not become less fundamental merely because
the state "afford[ed] him the option to remain a nonresident and
achieve admission to the Bar by examination."8 3 In addition to
Jadd, the reasoning contained in Gordon v. Commission on Character & Fitness,4 decided by the Court of Appeals of New York,
further supports the contention that there is no constitutionally
77. See infra notes 80-86 and accompanying text.
78. 765 F.2d at 661. See also supra note 20.
79. See supra note 45.
80. 105 S. Ct. at 1275 n.5. See, e.g., In re Jadd, 391 Mass. 227, 461 N.E.2d 760 (1984);
Sargus v. West Virginia Bd. of Law Examiners, 294 S.E.2d 440 (1982); Gordon v. Commission on Character & Fitness, 48 N.Y.2d 266, 397 N.E.2d 1309 (1979).
81. 391 Mass. 227, 461 N.E.2d 760 (1984).
82. Id. at 228, 237, 461 N.E.2d at 762, 765. The Jadd court correctly anticipated that
the Supreme Court would find the practice of law to be a "fundamental" right. Accordingly,
the court struck down the Massachusetts bar rule as violative of the Privileges and Immunities Clause, holding that the rule did not satisfy the two-part Hicklin test. Id.
83. 391 Mass. at 237, 461 N.E.2d at 766. Significantly, the Jadd court framed its
holding as follows:
If we are willing to admit a qualified person on motion if he or she moves to Massachusetts, we have already concluded that passing a bar examination is not an essential means in assessing his or her knowledge of local law or any other qualifications
for admission to the bar. Thus, the discrimination among persons seeking admission
on motion is based solely on residence. We conclude that the right of a nonresident
attorney to equal treatment with resident attorneys does not become less than fundamental or the discrimination justified, in a privileges and immunities sense, because
Massachusetts affords him the option to remain a nonresident and achieve admission
to the bar by examination.

Id.
84.

48 N.Y.2d 266, 397 N.E.2d 1309 (1979).
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significant difference between admission by motion and admission
by examination.8 5 As the Gordon Court stated:
The disparity of treatment between residents of the State and nonresidents
is manifest: given two equally qualified candidates who have passed the bar
examination (or, for that matter, meet the other requirements for admission on motion) and possess the requisite character and fitness, the rule
would deny one admission based solely upon residence.8 6

As both the Jadd and Gordon decisions were noted by the Piper
Court, it would appear that the Supreme Court was cognizant of
87
their applicability to its specific holding in Piper.
The Piper
Court also gave no indication that its holding was to be restricted
only to those situations in which a state's bar rule absolutely excluded nonresident attorneys.8 8 Therefore, in light of the principle
espoused in Piper, it would appear that any significant barrier,
with respect to the interstate mobility of lawyers, which treated a
class of resident attorneys more favorably than an equally qualified
class of nonresident attorneys should be struck down under the
Privileges and Immunities Clause.8 9 As evidenced by its decision in
Sestric, the Seventh Circuit did not agree.
In further support of its holding that Sestric had failed to make
out a prima facie Privileges and Immunities Clause claim, the Seventh Circuit concluded that the bar exam requirement was merely
an "inconvenience," as compared to a burden. 0 The court considered the inconvenience a reasonable one, explaining that nonresident attorneys establishing multi-state practices in Illinois would
be in a superior economic position to those attorneys who relocated
in Illinois with the intention of conducting all of their business in
that state.1 However, in Zobel v. Williams, 92 Justice O'Connor, in
85. Id. at 273, 397 N.E.2d at 1313.
86. Id. (emphasis added).
87. See supra note 82.
88. Piper, 105 S. Ct. at 1272-1281.
89. See Note, A Constitutional Analysis of State Bar Residency Requirements
Under the InterstatePrivileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV, 92 HARV. L. REV. 1461
(1979) [hereinafter cited as State Bar Residency Requirements]. The commentator concludes that "[njone of a state's interests in regulating admission to the bar [are] closely
served by simple or durational requirements." Id. at 1489.
90. Sestric, 765 F.2d at 658, 661, 664.
91. Id. at 660. Judge Posner stated:
A person who moves to another state is unlikely to have a multistate practice, while a
person who applies for admission to a state's bar as a nonresident must be seeking to
have at least a two state practice. It is not obviously unreasonable to make him take a
second bar exam.
Id. Cf. Brakel & Loh, Regulating the Multistate Practiceof Law, 50 WASH. L. REV. 699, 708
(1975) (the bar admission process "fails to account for lawyers who have some part time
business in several states.").
92. 457 U.S. 55 (1981).
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a significant concurring opinion, emphasized that the "'burden'
imposed on nonresidents was relative to the benefits enjoyed by
residents. '9 3 Thus, as the Privileges and Immunities Clause was
designed to address only "differences in treatment," 4 it would appear that the semantical gamesmanship engaged in by the Sestric
Court as to whether or not the Illinois rule "burdened" or "inconvenienced" nonresident attorneys was inappropriate. 5 The proper
inquiry, which the Sestric Court should have made, was whether or
not nonresident attorneys were unreasonably burdened, relative to
(new) resident attorneys, in pursuing the fundamental right to
practice law on an interstate scale.9
Perhaps Judge Posner's rationale for concluding that the Illinois
rule did not discriminate between resident and nonresident attorneys can best be described as judicial amnesia. Illinois Supreme
Court Rule 705 was not operative until an attorney, licensed in a
foreign state, became an "actual resident" of Illinois.9 7 By its
terms, the Illinois rule bestowed a substantial privilege only upon a
small class of (new) resident attorneys, to the exclusion of equally
qualified nonresident attorneys.9 8 The Sestric Court refuted the
discriminatory nature of the Illinois rule by reasoning that as long
93. Id. at 76 (O'Connor, J. concurring). The Zobel majority, per Chief Justice Burger,
struck down an Alaska dividend program that attempted to reward its citizens for past contributions based upon a durational residency requirement. The Court held that the Privileges and Immunities Clause was not applicable in situations where a discrimination was
imparted only between new and old residents. Id. at 59-60 & n.5. Nevertheless, the Court
held that the durational residency requirement was not rationally related to a legitimate
state interest and struck down the Alaska program as violative of the Equal Protection
Clause. Id. at 65.
94. Id. at 76 n.6.
95. See Sestric, 765 F.2d at 658.
96. See Zobel, 457 U.S. at 76 n.6. See also United Bldg. & Constr. v. Mayor & Council of Camdem, 104 S. Ct. 1020, 1027 (1984).
97. See supra note 4.
98. Id. The Sestric court did not believe that the bar exam requirement would have a
chilling effect on those nonresident attorneys desiring to practice law in Illinois on a substantial basis. 765 F.2d at 659. But see Note, Restrictions on Admission to the Bar: A Byproduct of Federalism, 98 U. PA. L. REV. 710, 716 (1950) [hereinafter cited as Admission
Restrictions] ("As an attorney becomes further removed from the systemized knowledge of
his law school days, his chances of success on the bar exam will decrease, [even though] his
general ability may have increased through active practice."). See also Note, Attorneys: Interstate and Federal Practice, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1711, 1712-13 (1967) [hereinafter cited as
Attorneys]; Smith, A Time for a National Practice of Law Act, 64 A.B.A.J. 557-60 (1978)
(experienced lawyers, as well as those attorneys who have specialized, "will find bar exams
increasingly onerous.").
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as a large class of (old) residents attorneys was similarly burdened,
there was "some assurance" that the burden imposed upon nonresident attorneys was not "arbitrary."09 In United Building & Construction v. Mayor & Council of Camden,10 0 however, the Supreme
Court reasoned that a state scheme was "not immune from constitutional review [under the Privileges and Immunities Clause]
merely because some in-state residents were similarly burdened."' 1 Thus, whether or not the majority of Illinois resident
attorneys are required to pass that state's bar exam does not foreclose a Privileges and Immunities Clause attack. 102
In short, the Seventh Circuit's preliminary holding that Sestric
had failed to make out a prima facie Privileges and Immunities
Clause claim represented an unwarranted attempt by the court to
take the principal case outside the scope of the Piper decision,'
even though the claim raised in Sestric was only one step removed
0 4 Notwithstanding its preliminary
from the claim raised in Piper.'
holding, the Seventh Circuit further held that the principal case
could not withstand the Piper test. 0 5 However, the court's Privileges and Immunities Clause analysis improperly focused upon the
state's power to regulate its legal profession rather than the manner in which the state could constitutionally regulate the practice
of law within its jurisdiction. 1 6
In applying the Piper test to the principal case, the Seventh Circuit based its analysis upon the proposition that the Illinois bar
exam requirement, as applied to nonresident attorneys, was an appropriate means of promoting the overall competence and quality
of that state's legal profession. 10 However, the real constitutional
issue raised in Sestric involved the legitimacy of the residence distinction as the sole factor in determining which non-resident attorneys would be subject to the state's bar examination requirement. 10 8 As the legitimacy of the bar exam requirement was
99. 765 F.2d at 659.
100. 104 S. Ct. 1020 (1984).
101. Id. at 1027.
102. Id. Cf. Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55, 76 (1982).
103. Sestric, 765 F.2d at 658, 661.
104. See supra note 45.
105. 765 F.2d at 664. See supra note 30.
106. See State Bar Residency Requirements, supra note 89, at 1472.
107. 765 F.2d at 664. See supra note 29.
108. See Brakel & Loh, supra note 91, at 707, in which the commentators explain that
a (new) resident attorney who is admitted to a state's bar via admission by reciprocity is
"[clonceptually ... admitted as a foreign attorney, though the vast majority of jurisdictions
blur the conceptual point by adding residence requirements .
I.."
Id. See also Admissions
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necessarily dependent upon the legitimacy of the residence distinction, correct application of the Piper test to the principal case required that the legitimacy of both the bar exam requirement and
the residence distinction be examined with respect to the state interest which was sought to be protected by Illinois Supreme Court
Rule 705.'09
The legitimate state interest which the Illinois rule sought to effectuate and to safeguard was the overall competence and quality
of that state's legal profession. 1 0 The Piper test consisted of two
distinct hurdles which the state was required to overcome, the first
of which required the state to show that there was a "substantial
reason" for the discrimination."' Judge Posner's opinion, however,
was devoid of any reference to a demonstration by the state that
nonresident attorneys posed a substantial threat to attorney competence with the State of Illinois." 2 On the contrary, in light of its
purpose, the Illinois rule was both markedly "overinclusive" and
markedly "underinclusive. '' 1 3 In Piper, the Supreme Court reasoned that there was no cause to believe that nonresident attorneys would be less inclined to: familiarize themselves with local
law and court proceedings, conduct ethical in-state practices, avail
themselves to court proceedings, or partake in their fair share of
pro bono work. 1 4 Furthermore, the Piper Court emphasized that
Restrictions,supra note 93, at 716 (residence requirements "preclude an attorney from being admitted without changing his domicile.
109. See supranote 4.
110. See, e.g., Lowrie v. Goldenhersh, 716 F.2d 401, 408 (7th Cir. 1983); Hawkins v.
Moss, 503 F.2d 1171, 1176 (4th Cir. 1974); In re Grifliths, 413 U.S. 717, 723 (1973). Cf.
Brakel & Loh, supra note 91, at 702. There are two principal rationales for stringent bar
admission standards: protection of a state's citizens and economic protection of a state's
resident attorneys. Id. However, as the second rationale is "prima facie unconstitutional,"
state bar admission rules must necessarily be grounded in the public protectionism rationale. Id. See also Hafter, supra note 5, at 6-7.
111. See supra note 30 and text accompanying notes 68-69.
112. See State Bar Residency Requirements, supra note 89, at 1479 ("the burden of
proof would be on the state to satisfy the first test by showing that nonresidents are a major
source of the problem the state seeks to alleviate.").
113. The Illinois rule was "underinclusive" because the burden of passing the Illinois
bar exam prior to permanent admission to that state's bar fell upon a much narrower class
of similarly situated nonresident attorneys than the purpose of the rule otherwise logically
dictated. The Illinois rule was also "overinclusive," as the burden of passing that state's bar
exam fell upon a class of nonresident attorneys who were not similarly situated in terms of
the purpose of the Illinois rule. See generally TRaE, supra note 11, § 16-4, at 997-99; Tussman & tenBroek, The Equal Protectionof the Laws, 37 CAL. L. REV. 341, 346, 348-52 (1949);
Developments in the Law-Equal Protection, 82 HARv. L. REV. 1065, 1084, 1086 (1969)
[hereinafter cited as Developments].
114. Piper, 104 S. Ct. at 1279. See also In re Jadd, 391 Mass. 227, 460 N.E.2d 760
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nonresident attorneys would be subject to the disciplinary board of
the state in which they were admitted to practice law." 5 As was
the case in Piper,"' the State of Illinois failed to demonstrate that
nonresident attorneys created peculiar problems of incompetence
which did not also emanate from resident attorneys, hence, the
first prong of the Piper test was not met.
The second prong of Piper test required the state to show that
there was a "substantial relationship" between the discrimination
and the legitimate state interest, as demonstrated by an absence of
less discriminatory alternatives. 7 In applying this part of the
Piper test to Sestric, the Seventh Circuit rejected suggested alternatives" 8 for promoting in-state attorney competence, believing
that such alternatives would have been more burdensome upon
nonresident attorneys than the general bar exam requirement contained in the Illinois rule." 9 However, the court's analysis was misguided in that each of the alternative methods rejected would have
been applied equally to all attorneys admitted to the Illinois bar,
without regard to whether such attorneys were originally admitted
upon motion or by examination.' 2" Thus, each alternative method
would have promoted attorney competence while not discriminating against nonresident attorneys. 2 ' Hence, the State of Illinois
also failed to satisfy the second prong of the Piper test. While the
(1984), in which the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts stated: "In the cases, there
has been no showing that nonresidents are 'peculiar sources' of attorney incompetence or
that a residency requirement is substantially related to the solution of any problem; in the
sense that less discriminatory means could not be adopted." Id. at 234, 460 N.E.2d at 764.
See also Gordon v. Commission on Character & Fitness, 48 N.Y.2d 266, 397 N.E.2d 1309
(1979), wherein New York's highest court stated: "Indeed, aside from the oblique reference
to purported 'dangers' said to be inherent in the licensing of nonresident attorneys, the
State is at a complete loss to justify the . . . discrimination against nonresidents.
Id.
at 273-74, 397 N.E.2d at 1313. See also supra note 86 and accompanying text.
115. 105 S. Ct. at 1279-80.
116. See supra note 30 and text accompanying notes 69.
117. 105 S. Ct. at 1279.
118. 765 F.2d at 662-63. The "alternative methods" rejected by the Sestric court for
assuring that nonresident attorneys were competent to practice Illinois law included: "[a]
continuing practice requirement measured by a minimum volume of local work per year,"
"mandatory continuing legal education" for all attorneys, and "periodic re-examination" of
all attorneys in areas of general law and specialization, and the requirement of a "stiff fee."
Id. But see Jadd, 391 Mass. at 233-34, 460 N.E.2d at 764-66 (court suggested an exam on
local practice and appointment of agents for service of process within the state); Gordon, 48
N.Y.2d at 274-75, 397 N.E.2d at 1314 (court suggested several less discriminatory alternatives available to the state to insure attorney competence.).
119. 765 F.2d at 663.
120. See generally Hafter, supra note 5, at 39-42.
121. Id.
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Privileges and Immunities Clause does not interfere with a state's
ability to maintain the quality of its legal profession, it does preclude a state from discriminating against nonresident attorneys,
relative to privileges bestowed upon (new) resident attorneys, for
no apparent reason other than the fact that such equally qualified
nonresident attorneys choose to remain nonresidents.1 2 Such was
the case in Sestric.
The Seventh Circuit next addressed Sestric's Commerce Clause
claim.1 23 Historically, the origins of the Commerce Clause are
found in the Articles of Confederation.1 24 While both the Privileges
and Immunities Clause and the Commerce Clause have a "mutually reinforcing relationship, 1 25 the Supreme Court acknowledged
in United Building that each clause "ha[d] different aims and set
different standards for state conduct."126 In Pike v.Bruce Church,
Inc., 27 the Supreme Court enunciated the general rule that when a
statute or regulation acts "evenhandedly" to promote a legitimate
state interest, such state action will be upheld "unless the burden
imposed upon such commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the
putative local benefits.' 28 Thus, when a state imposes nondiscrim122. See also Jadd, 391 Mass. at 236, 460 N.E.2d at 765-66; Gordon, 48 N.Y.2d at 275,
397 N.E.2d at 1314.
123. 765 F.2d at 664.
124. See supra note 45. See also Hicklin v. Orbeck, 437 U.S. 518, 531-32 (1978).
125. Hicklin, 437 U.S. at 531.
126. United Bldg. & Constr. v. Mayor & Council of Camdem, 104 S. Ct. 1020, 1028
(1984). In United Building, the Supreme Court noted that the "Commerce Clause acts as an
implied restraint upon state regulatory powers [while the] Privileges and Immunities Clause
...imposes a direct restraint on state action in the interests of interstate harmony." Id.
Thus, given the current state of the law with respect to both the Privileges and Immunities Clause and the Commerce Clause, the Sestric court was incorrect in its assumption that
in examining an alleged discrimination, the same standard of review should apply without
regard to which clause is cited as the basis for one's claim. See Sestric, 765 F.2d at 664.
In United Building, a Commerce Clause claim could not be maintained because the state
was acting as a market-participant rather than as a market-regulator. 104 S. Ct. at 1025. See
also White v. Massachusetts Council of Constr. Employers, 103 S. Ct. 1042 (1983). However,
the United Building case stands for the proposition that a Privileges and Immunities clause
claim can be maintained even though a Commerce Clause claim is foreclosed. 104 S. Ct. at
1027.
127. 397 U.S. 137 (1970).
128. Id. at 142. The Pike Court summarized the law with respect to state regulation of
interstate commerce as such:
[Tihe general rule that emerges can be phrased as follows: Where the statute regulates evenhandedly to effectuate a legitimate local public interest, and its effects on
interstate commerce are only incidental, it will be upheld unless the burden imposed
on such commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the putative local benefits .... If
a legitimate local purpose is found, then the question becomes one of degree. And the
extent of the burden that will be tolerated will of course depend on the nature of the
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inatory burdens upon interstate commerce, the standard of review
invoked, within the context of Commerce Clause analysis, is sufficiently broad enough to uphold the state conduct upon any "conceivable" rational basis once a legitimate state interest is found. 2 9
However, when the burdens imposed by a statute or regulation
have the effect of discriminating exclusively against nonresidents,
the Supreme Court has invoked a less deferential standard of review, such that the burden of proof falls upon the state to show
that less discriminatory alternatives were not adequate to effectuate a legitimate state interest.'3 0
The traditional notion that the practice of law was not an activity sufficiently commercial in nature to place it within the scope of
the Commerce Clause is no longer valid.13 1 In Goldfarb v. Virginia
State Bar," 2 the Supreme Court recognized that "lawyers play an
important part in commercial intercourse."' 3 Hence, the Goldfarb
Court held that minimum fee schedules, which were set by a local
chapter of the Virginia State Bar and enforced by the Virginia
State Bar, constituted illegal restraints on trade.'" Similarly, in
Bates v. State Bar of Arizona,' 35 the Supreme Court again acknowledged the important commercial function that lawyers play
local interest involved, and on whether it could be promoted as well with a lesser
impact on interstate activities.
Id.
129. See, e.g., Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456 (1982) ("Only if
the burden on interstate commerce clearly outweighs the State's legitimate purposes does
such a regulation violate the Commerce Clause."); United States v. Carolene Products Co.,
304 U.S. 144, 154 (1938) (a statute affecting interstate commerce will be upheld "unless...
it is of such a character as to preclude the assumption that it rests upon some rational basis
."). See generally TRIBE, supra note 11, § 16-3, at 996.
130. See, e.g., Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison, 340 U.S. 349, 354-56 (1951) (origin of
discriminatory effect on interstate commerce analysis coupled with less restrictive alternative inquiry); Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333 (1977)
(unanimous adoption of the standard of review set forth in Dean Milk); City of Philadelphia
v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617 (1978) (adoption of a virtual per se rule of invalidity with respect to state regulation of interstate commerce through application of discriminatory
means). See also Note, Commerce Clause, 92 HARV. L. REV. 57, 61 (1978) (suggesting that
the significance of the New Jersey decision is that it represents a finding by the Court of
"protectionism" without a finding of "impermissable economic motivation.").
131. See State Bar Residency Requirements, supra note 89, at
1472-75.
132. 421 U.S. 773 (1975).
133. Id. at 788.
134. Id. at 785. In Goldfarb, minimum fee schedules concerning routine legal matters
were set by the local bar and enforced by the Virginia State bar. The Supreme Court struck
down the price-fixing scheme, holding that the minimum fee. schedules constituted a restraint on trade as defined by § 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act. 421 U.S. at 785.
135. 443 U.S. 350 (1977).
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in modern society and invalidated an Arizona Supreme Court rule
which restrained attorney advertising.1 36 Although neither Goldfarb nor Bates involved Commerce Clause analysis, each case is
significant in that the Supreme Court recognized that the practice
of law is basically a commercial endeavor. 137 As the Supreme Court
has consistently applied a liberal definition as to what constitutes
"commerce" under the Commerce Clause, 3 8 it is undisputed that
the practice of law is subject to the implied restraints of the Commerce Clause.
In view of this deferential standard of review, the Sestric Court
was correct in holding that the Illinois rule did not violate the implied restraints of the Commerce Clause.' 39 Although the rule did
not act "totally evenhandedly,"'' 0 the proper inquiry was whether
the Illinois rule so burdened the interstate mobility of attorneys
such that the impact of the rule was "clearly excessive" in relation
to the state's legitimate interest in maintaining the quality of its
legal profession.14 ' Since Illinois Supreme Court Rule 70542 did
not operate to exclude all nonresident attorneys, and because most
(old) resident attorneys were required to take the bar exam, the
Illinois rule was probably not unreasonably excessive under the
Commerce Clause.
Finally, the Seventh Circuit addressed Sestric's claim that Illinois Supreme Court Rule 705 violated the Equal Protection Clause
of the fourteenth amendment.4 3 In essence, Sestric argued that
the Illinois rule arbitrarily distinguished between equally qualified
136. Id. at 368 n.19. In Bates, the Court struck down a ban on attorney advertising
which was enforced by the Arizona State Bar as being violative of such attorneys' first
amendment right to truthful commercial advertising. Id. at 350. Cf. Ohralik v. Ohio State
Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447 (1978) (Supreme court upheld Ohio bar rule which precluded faceto-face solicitation of prospective clients by attorneys).
137. See also State Bar Residency Requirements, supra note 89, at 1474; Hafter,
supra note 5, at 30.
138. See, e.g., City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617 (1978) (the free flow of
garbage protected by the Commerce Clause); Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160 (1941)
(people constitute commerce within the definition of the Commerce Clause).
139. 765 F.2d at 661. But see State Bar Residency Requirements, supra note 85, at
1472-73 (suggesting that although state bar residency requirements arguably violate the implied restraints of the Commerce Clause, the Privileges and Immunities Clause represents
the "preferable approach.").
140. 765 F.2d at 664.
141. See supra notes 128-29 and accompanying text.
142. See supra note 4.
143. See supra note 11. It was Justice Holmes' view that the Equal Protection Clause
represented "the last resort of constitutional arguments." Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 208
(1927).
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by motion to the Illinois bar solely on the
candidates for admission
144
residence.
of
basis
Traditionally, with respect to economic and general social welfare legislation, any discrimination between similarly situated persons 145 by a state14 6 will be upheld if such discrimination is rationally related to any legitimate state interest."47 However, when a
similarly situated persons involves either a
discrimination between
"suspect" class14 8 or a "fundamental" right,"19 such discrimination
will be subject to strict scrutiny.15 0 Historically, then, equal protection attacks by nonresident attorneys with respect to a particular
state's residency requirements 15 1 have been unsuccessful due to the
inability of such attorneys to characterize themselves as a "suspect" class or to characterize the practice of law as a "fundamental" right.15 2 Thus, given a state's legitimate interest in promoting
144. 765 F.2d at 661.
145. See Tussman & tenBroek, supra note 113, at 346, wherein the authors state: "A
reasonable classification is one which includes all persons who are similarly situated with
respect to the purpose of the law." Id. See also Developments, supra note 113, at 1077.
146. See Developments, supra note 113, at 1072 (sufficient state action, determined on
an ad hoc basis, is required before the Equal Protection Clause of the fourteenth amendment becomes an appropriate vehicle to eradicate discrimination).
147. See supra note 129. Cf. Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412 (1920), in
which the Court formulated a higher standard of review than traditional minimum rationality: "But the classification must be reasonable, not arbitrary, and must rest upon some
ground of difference having a fair and substantial relation to the object of the legislation, so
that all persons similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike." Id. at 415.
148. See Developments, supra note 113, at 1087-88 (the traditionally "suspect" classes
are race, lineage, and alienage). See also Tussman & tenBroek, supra note 107, at 360.
149. See Developments, supra note 113, at 1120. Some "fundamental" rights which
have been found by the Court include: the right to procreate (Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316
U.S. 535 (1942)); the right to vote (Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964)); the right to
certain fundamental criminal procedures (Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956)); the right to
travel (Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969)); and, the right to equivalent employment
opportunities, such as the practice of law (Supreme Court of New Hampshire v. Piper, 105
S. Ct. 1272 (1984)).
150. See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 9, 11 (1967) (indicating that the state had
the "very heavy burden" of establishing that the discriminatory classification was necessary
to promote a compelling state interest); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) ("[Alny
classification which serves to penalize the exercise of a [fundamental] right, [must be] shown
to be necessary to promote a compelling governmental interest ....... (emphasis in
original)).
151. See State Bar Residency Requirements, supra note 89, at 1461. There are two
types of residency requirements: "simple," such as that in Illinois Supreme Court Rule
705(d) (see supra note 4), or "durational." Id.
152. See Halter, supra note 5, at 23-28. See also State Bar Residency Requirements,
supra note 89, at 1462-64, in which the commentator suggests that residency requirements
(simple and short durational) are virtually immune from an equal protection minimum rationality standard of review. See also Note, The Constitutionalityof State Residency Requirements for Admission to the Bar, 71 MICH. L. REv. 838, 851-52 (1973), in which it is
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the quality of its legal profession,"' equal protection challenges initiated by nonresident attorneys have not been able to survive the
minimum rationality standard of review applied by the courts. 54
55
In San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez,'
the Supreme Court enunciated the policy that it would not "create
substantive constitutional rights in the name of guaranteeing equal
protection of the laws."1'6 Thus, the San Antonio Court signaled
that courts would not subject an alleged state discrimination to
strict scrutiny, within the context of equal protection analysis, unless the "right" which had been impaired were expressly or implicitly guaranteed by the Constitution.1 57 In light of Piper, in which
the Supreme Court held that the opportunity to practice law was a
"fundamental" right within the meaning of article IV, section 2 of
the Constitution,15 the Sestric Court should have subjected the
Illinois rule to strict scrutiny.
Given the fundamental character of the right involved in the
principal case, the discrimination between similarly situated nonresident attorneys could only be upheld if the state showed that
such discrimination was necessary to promote a compelling state
interest.15 9 However, because of the existence of less discriminatory
suggested that simple and durational requirements could withstand strict scrutiny, although
"rigid application of the strict test might invalidate the requirement."
153. See Note, supra note 152, at 851 (a state's interest in promoting the quality of its
legal profession is compelling).
154. But see Schware v. Board of Law Examiners, 353 U.S. 232, 238-39 (1957); Konigsberg v. State Bar, 353 U.S. 252, 273 (1957).
155. San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
156. Id. at 33-34. The Rodriguez Court, per Justice Powell, defined the scope of "fundamental" right Equal Protection Clause analysis as follows: "It is not the province of this
Court to create substantive constitutional rights in the name of guaranteeing equal protection of the laws. . . .Rather, the answer lies in assessing whether there is a right . . .explicitly.or implicitly guaranteed by the Constitution." Id.
157. Id.
.158. See supra notes 11, 66-72 and accompanying text.
159. The first inquiry in an Equal Protection Clause analysis necessarily involves a
determination as to whether there has been a discrimination between similarly situated persons with respect to the purpose of the law. See supra note 145. Because economic protectionism is per se unconstitutional, the purpose of the Illinois bar rule must be perceived as
promoting the quality of that state's legal profession. The Sestric court apparently did not
dispute the fact that Sestric was similarly situated, in terms of demonstrated competence,
with (new) resident attorneys; however, the Sestric court hypothesized that the Illinois rule
did not discriminate against nonresident attorneys. 765 F.2d at 661. Yet, by its terms, the
Illinois rule made it more difficult for nonresident attorneys to pursue the fundamental
right to practice law than similarly situated (new) resident attorneys, even though essentially, (new) resident attorneys were admitted to the Illinois bar on the basis of their foreign
license. As .it cannot be forcefully argued that there was not a sufficiently close nexus between the opportunity to practice law on a permanent basis in Illinois and Illinois Supreme
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alternatives, 160 it cannot be forcefully argued that the provision of
the Illinois rule which required all potential applicants to become
"actual residents" ' ' of Illinois was necessary to ensure attorney
competence within that state. That being the case, Illinois Supreme Court Rule 705 violated the Equal Protection Clause.
Unquestionably, the issues raised in Sestric are controversial because they touch directly upon the notion of state sovereignty,"6 2 a
concept which was presupposed by the Framers of the Constitution"'3 and reinforced by the tenth amendment." 4 As the Piper decision itself represents such an extraordinary departure from the
traditional deference afforded to states,65 the Sestric Court, ultimately, was unwilling to extend its scope.
Although the Seventh Circuit feared that invalidation of the "actual resident"'166 provision would force the State of Illinois to
choose between "admit[ting] on motion most lawyers in the country" and repealing Illinois Supreme Court Rule 705 in total,/s 7 the
Court Rule 705, the discriminatory impact of the rule can only be sustained if necessary to
promote a compelling state interest (i.e., attorney competence).
160. See supra note 118. See, e.g., cases cited supra note 115. See generally Brakel &
Loh, supra note 87, passim.
161. See supra note 4.
162. See, e.g., Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Recl. Ass'n, 452 U.S. 265 (1981);
National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976). But see Garcia v. San Antonio
Metropolitan Transit Auth., 105 S. Ct. 1005 (1985), wherein the sharply divided Court held:
"State sovereign interests ... are more properly protected by procedural safeguards inherent in the structure of the federal system than by judicially created limitations on federal
power." 105 S. Ct. at 1020. See generally TRIBE, supra note 11, § 5-20, at 300-03; J. NOWAK,
R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 170-81 (2d ed. 1983).
163. See TRIBE, supra note 11, § 5-20, at 301 ("It is clear . . . that the Constitution
does presuppose the existence of states as entities independent of the national
government.").
164. The tenth amendment provides: "The powers not delegated to the United States
by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people." U.S. CONST. amend. X.
165. Cf. In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717, 729 (1973), wherein the Court held: "[L]awyers
are not officials of government by virtue of being lawyers. . . [nior does the status of holding a license to practice law place one so close to the core of the political process as to make
him a formulator of government policy." Id.
166. See supra note 4.
167. 765 F.2d at 663. The Sestric court "feared" that invalidation of the "actual resident" provision contained in the Illinois bar rule would inundate the state with nonresident
attorney applicants. However, given the realities of the situation, that "fear" was totally
unwarranted. The State of Illinois would not be "forced" to admit nonresident attorneys
who had not demonstrated that they were otherwise qualified with respect to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 705. Thus, all nonresident applicants would still be required to show:
attainment of sufficient educational qualifications, fulfillment of the continuous practice requirement, reciprocal provisions between Illinois and the nonresident's state, and competence with respect to the professional responsibility examination. See supra note 4. In ef-
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Supreme Court did not suggest in Piper that the state would be
required to admit to its bar any nonresident attorney who was not
otherwise qualified. Furthermore, both the state bar and the citizens of Illinois would be adequately protected by that state's retention of full disciplinary power over all attorneys practicing law
within its jurisdiction,6 8 in conjunction with the state's appointment of in-state agents for service of process with respect to nonresident attorneys.' 69 In effect, the simple residency requirement
contained in the Illinois rule served no legitimate purpose other
than to substantially burden otherwise qualified nonresident attorneys desirous of establishing multi-state practices. Certainly, the
protectionist aspect of such a rule cannot be easily dismissed.'7 0
The justifications offered by the Sestric Court for perpetuating
an antiquated system in which the practice of law is substantially
restricted by the jurisdictional limits of each state are inconsistent
with the evolution of law as an important national and commercial
activity.' 7 1 The Seventh Circuit concluded that the Illinois rule
merely represented a "healthy form of rivalry" between states, in
which the State of Illinois was attempting to attract qualified attorneys into its citizenry.'72 Yet, it does not follow that when a
state has failed to attract nonresidents into its citizenry, that state
can then treat the class of nonresidents less favorably than its own
citizens when a fundamental right is involved.
Richard T. Hamilton, Jr.

fect, the requirement that applicants establish residence in Illinois was not necessary to
effectuate the intended purpose of the Illinois rule. See generally Note, New Mexico's Bar
Residency Requirement as an UnconstitutionalPenalty on Applicants Right to Travel, 2
N.M.L. REV. 252 (1972) (residency requirements bear a "questionable relationship to the
state's legitimate interest in insuring the admission of only high caliber applicants .
168. See supra notes 114-15 and accompanying text.
169. See supra notes 114 & 118 and accompanying text.
170. See Dalton & Williamson, State Barriers Against Lawyers, 25 U. KAN. L. REV.
144, 147 (1957); Smith, Time for a National Practice of Law Act, 64 A.B.A.J. 557 (1978);
Admission Restrictions, supra note 93, at 711.
171. See supra notes 123-28 and accompanying text.
172. 765 F.2d at 660.

